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As it happens once and again in the legal sphere, we face here an initial 
problem, related with language and meanings. Secularism is a word which 
has been associated with other terms, like ―secular‖, ―secularization‖, 
―neutrality‖ and ―laïcité‖. And I think that it is fair to say that the meaning 
of these terms is not completely clear and that it depends on scholars‘ 
preferences and on the language we use.  
 
In Latin languages, the word ―laïcité‖ (French), ―laicidad‖ (Spanish), 
―laicità‖ (Italian) address the basic idea of some sort of separation (not 
necessarily isolation) between churches and state. In the political and legal 
imaginary, the word ―laïcité‖ seems to recall the more strong and emphatic 
expression of strict separation. In Anglo-Saxon languages, it seems to be 
more appropriate to designed separation with the term ―religious and 
ideological neutrality‖. Neutrality could be understood in different ways 
and in several degrees. 
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All those terms (―laïcité‖, ―neutrality‖ and ―separation‖) have suffered a 
―deflationary process‖ in the political and legal sphere, as a result of which 
it is difficult to understand legally what kind of separation are we dealing 
with and to what measure religious freedom is protected satisfactorily. For 
the purposes of this brief presentation, I shall try to sketch some ideas and 
clarifications. Also I shall address some basic problems related to the topic 




―Secular‖ means ―not connected with religious or spiritual matters‖. In this 
sense it is probably right to say that many of us live in secular states, in 
countries in which the origin and justification of the political power is 
totally secular, states in which religion is present but, as Charles Taylor 
points out, religion «occupies a different place in social life, compatible 
with the sense that all social action take place in profane time»
2
. «Put in 
another way, in our "secular" societies, you can engage fully in politics 




Along with the term secular, immediately it appears the term 
―secularization‖. Strictly speaking, ―secularization‖ means «to transfer 
from ecclesiastical to civil or lay use, possession, or control». As Professor 
Casanova has pointed out, «[s]ecularization as a concept refers to the actual 
historical process whereby this dualist system within "this world" and the 
sacramental structures of mediation between this world and the other world 
progressively break down until the entire medieval system of classification 
disappears, to be replaced by new systems of spatial structuration of the 
spheres. Max Weber's expressive image of the breaking of the monastery 
walls remains perhaps the best graphic expression of this radical spatial 
restructuration. The wall separating the religious and the secular realms 
within "this world" breaks down. The separation between "this world" and 
"the other world," for the time being at least, remains. But from now on, 
there will be only one single "this world," the secular one, within which 
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religion will have to find its own place»
4
. Secularization is process in 
which religion ceases to be the central factor of social cohesion, of 
collective world explanation, to become a choice among other choices.  
Secularization, according to Olivier Roy, «is a social phenomenon that 
requires no political implementation»
5
. It would be proper to say that 
religion has been ―tamed‖ or ―domesticated‖ and rendered under the legal 
scheme of the civil rights as ―freedom of religion of belief‖. The 
understanding of religion as a matter of choice leads to the understanding 
of religion as a matter of freedom
6
. However, this perspective may lead 
also to privatization of religion (a private choice) and also to the detriment 




With regard to secularization, it is important to note two caveats. The first 
is that the secularization theory has been construed according to European 
standards. Therefore it cannot simply be applied to other civilizations. The 
second caveat is that traditional theories on secularization, which equate 
modernity, scientific development, economic improvement, migration to 
urban centers, etc. with secularization, have been replaced with theories 
which equate modernity with pluralism
8
. In this sense, scholars stress the 
difference between Europe and the United States in how the process of 




Secularism: ideology and legal framework of Church-State relations 
 
At first glance, it would seem that secularization is related to secularism. 
However, the relationship is not so plain and simple. In common use, 
secularism means ―indifference to or rejection or exclusion of religion and 
religious considerations‖. In a more technical use, secularism is a 
polysemic word which embraces at least two different meanings. 
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According to Lorenzo Zucca, the first meaning of secularism deals with a 
«political project with a set of normative claims as to the relationship 
between religion and the state. Secularism and secularization may go hand 
in hand as it was the case in Europe until the end of last century»
10
. 
According to this first meaning, secularism is not a specific legal regime, 
but a modern competing worldview, partly originated in the Enlightment, 
which involves a particular philosophical vision of the human being and of 
society and embraces all kind of considerations dealing with the social and 
political weight of religion, the differentiation of the public and the private 
sphere of action, the role of government in regulating social affairs, the 
content of the law, the aims of state-sponsored education, the proper 
behavior of politicians, judges and state agents, etc. For the purposes of this 
paper let‘s say briefly that secularism as a worldview «claims to provide a 
value system common to all citizens by expelling religion into the private 
sphere»
11
. To put it simply, the term secularism «describes and ideology 




As far as I know, there is no democratic State in the world which perfectly 
reflects the first meaning of secularism, namely secularism as a 
worldview
13
. Besides, it seems to me that secularism as a worldview is 
neither possible nor plausible to put into full practice. It is not possible, 
since international, regional and national experiences —specially in these 
days— shows a progressive de-privatization of religion14. And it is nor 
plausible, since in some cases secularism may lead to the infringement of 
freedom of religion
15
.   
 
There is a second meaning of secularism, which deals with political and 
legal practices in many countries. In democratic countries governed by the 
rule of Law, it is common —at the Constitutional level or at the highest 
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laws level— to recognize freedom of religion or belief and to declare some 
sort of separation between State and institutionalized beliefs, religion, 
ideologies, etc. This practical secularism may be designated in many 
different ways such as the old ―fighting secularism‖ like in France16, 
―positive secularism‖ like in Italy17 and Spain18, or ―opened secularism‖ 
like in Québec
19
. It may be also proper to say that, according to this second 
meaning of secularism, there are some proxies or different forms to 
translate secularism into the law
20. In this sense, ―separation of church and 
state‖ means «that non-secular bodies shall not exercise secular power, not 
even by the grace of the sovereign. Vice versa, secular bodies shall not 
exercise ecclesiastical power (the principle of church autonomy or non-
interference)»
21. And ―neutrality‖ designates impartiality of the state, a 
state attitude that avoids taking sides among competing beliefs of 
worldviews. 
 
There are many varieties, many practical solutions, different legal 
arrangements which reflect secularization as separation between State and 
Religions… None of them is the optimal model22. In building up 
secularism, States have to strike a balance between freedom and equality. 
This balance is not always well reached. In many European countries 
frequently the balance between freedom and equality brings about 
collaterally certain advantages and special regulations for major historical 
religions, while minority religions haven‘t access to certain legal benefits in 
different issues, like public funding, tax exemptions, religious spiritual 
counseling in hospitals and prisons, etc. While some of these legal 
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regulations does not amount necessarily a legal discriminations against 
religious minorities, others practices may cause legal discrimination against 
believers of minority religions. In this sense, it seems to me that the role of 
the judiciary is vital in extending those benefits to minorities and in 
enjoining discrimination. It would be expected also that the increasing 
religious pluralism will lead to a more careful attention paid to new 
religions in European countries. 
 
The rationale of secularism in politics and in the laws of the states has two 
sources. The first source is positive, namely the protection of freedom of 
religion itself. According to this first rationale, the best way to protect and 
promote freedom of religion requires from the state a strong degree of 
detachment from religion and some degree of differentiation of the roles, 
nature and goals of religions and of states. The role of the State is neither to 
bring salvation not to hinder it. And the role of religion is neither to 
manage secular affairs nor to hamper social development and 





Along with this positive justification, there is another negative one. This 
negative justification or rationale deals with the historical experience of the 
role of religions in national and international affairs, according to which the 
combination of religion with politics and with the State, renders strife and 
division between social groups, states, nations and ethnic groups. To avoid 
strife and division, separation between state and religion is not only 
desiderable but essential. Recent affairs on religious extremism and fear to 
the so-called ―strong religions‖ stress the support of this negative 




Nowadays, secularism in state laws and politics confronts important 
challenges difficult to solve. In almost all cases, these challenges deal with 
the full observance of freedom of religion and with the full respect of the 
role and functions of religious groups. 
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One of these challenges deals with education. The State claims a leading 
role concerning education as a tool for fostering democracy and shaping the 
profile of responsible and proactive citizens. This role has been growing in 
recent years because both International organizations and States are aware 
that education is vital to overcome some critical aspects of post-modernity 
and globalization. At the same time, religions claim to have an important 
role in education too, both as an agent promoting education at the service 
of parents and society, according to their own perspective and worldview, 
and as an important subject of the educational syllabus. These claims may 
clash between them and cast many questions: Does the State have the only 
leading role in education? Is it proper to the State to have the monopoly of 
educational issues? Can be religion be part of the educational syllabus at 
the different levels? And, how can religion be part of the syllabus? 
 
Another important challenge for secularism is the scope and limits of 
freedom of expression when confronted with religious ideas, religious 
groups and religious sensibilities. There are different legal responses to that 
complex issue, among them: blasphemy laws, anti-defamation laws, 
criminal laws to protect religious sentiments, hate speech laws, etc. There 
is a growing awareness of the difficulty in reaching a satisfactory solution 
in national laws, especially in those cases in which the conflict becomes 
international or global. Different affairs concerning cartoons, sacred books 
burning, transgressive art, etc. lead to the provisional conclusion that State 
laws are hardly the last word in resolving these sensitive issues.  
 
In recent years, we have faced something which seems to be an unending 
problem, namely religious clothing or religious attire. In some cases, States 
require from its citizens a religiously neutral identity in certain public 
spaces and in certain official facilities. In doing so, the secular state intends 
to preserve its neutral and secular culture to afford freedom to all and to 
avoid an unduly religious influence. However, this requirement from the 
State compels citizens to shed their own religious and cultural identity. 
Indiscriminate ban of certain religious attire, though justified, does not 
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seem to be the best solution, according to international organizations
24
. 
Undoubtedly this is another important challenge for the secular state.     
 
Displaying of religious symbols in public places or in those elements which 
define the identity of a given country (like the flag, the anthem the coat of 
arms, etc.) is another relevant issue. How to reconcile those historical 
elements and symbols with the secular state? In other words, which is the 
permissible limitation to the negative aspect of freedom of religion of 
citizens? Is the solution to this issue beyond competing interests and rights, 
to reach an area of tolerance towards certain symbols?    
 
We may see another interesting issue in labour law and in non-
discrimination policies applied to religious entities and organizations. I 
think that in this area it is especially important to take into account that the 
enterprise carried out by religious groups frequently requires a high degree 
of identification of workers with the spirit and mind which inspired the job. 
And this is something that state law may not perceive in its full extent. This 
delicate area calls upon the serious evaluation of the content and scope of 
religious autonomy.    
 
In the aforementioned areas, and in many others, religious conscientious 
objection before State regulations is at stake, especially in sensible areas 
related the ethical dimension of behavior. It is a field which required from 
the State a great amount of fairness in balancing the respect of religious 
conscience and the protection of the state‘s interests which contested legal 
norms protect and support.   
 
But the most important challenge for secularist States is the scope of 
secularism itself. In a recent conversation with my friend and colleague 
Javier Martínez-Torrón, we realized the increasing social presence and 
activity of non-theistic, atheistic and humanist organizations which very 
often request and obtain from the State legal personality and status akin to 
that of religious communities. These organizations claim from the State an 
implicit but visible endorsement of their ideas —many of them coincide 
apparently with those of the State. This may well be the case of the claim 
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for religious neutrality. Is religious neutrality really neutral? Probably, if 
we understand neutrality as a concept embracing also all kind of 
worldviews, it is so. But, at the same time, States cannot be neutral by 
definition (it is impossible). Neutrality is a operational State principle or 
attitude which applies only to certain areas of human activity. In a way, this 
reminds me the recent oral submission by Professor Weiler on behalf of 
Third party intervening States in the Lautsi case
25
 before the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
26
. In that occasion, 
Professor Weiler pointed out: «if the social pallet of society were only 
composed of blue yellow and red groups, then black – the absence of color 
– would be a neutral colour. But once one of the social forces in society has 
appropriated black as its colour, than that choice is no longer neutral. 
Secularism does not favour a wall deprived of all State symbols. It is 
religious symbols which are anathema». The great risk and challenge for a 
secularist State is then avoiding any kind of confessional neutrality, giving 
back to any sort of religion and welcoming the ideology of secularism 
under the guise of neutrality.      
 
Tackling with challenges: general approaches 
 
How can the secular state tackle all these challenges? Probably there are 
many responses to this question, but I would like to bring to your 
consideration a recent exchange on secularism and on the secular state 
between two European professors of constitutional law, András Sajó and 
Lorenzo Zucca, in the International Journal of Constitutional Law. The 
exchange reflects two different approaches and answers to the challenges 
described before.  
 
Professor Sajó contended that the struggle for constitutionalism and for the 
equal enjoyment of fundamental rights require a strong secular state before 
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(against)  the threat of strong religions who pretend to reconquer a directive 
role in the public square and to achieve religious goals at the expense of the 
frailty of the secular state. In this sense, it seems that the state must protect 
freedoms (including freedom of religion) against religions. According to 
Sajó, only the strong secular state and the public reason language in the 
public square could guarantee full and equal freedom. This is the liberal 
perspective of the secular State. 
 
By contrast, Professor Zucca thinks that the challenges before the secular 
state do not come from strong religions. Religions are not the problem, but 
perhaps only the symptom. The very problem is the inability of the secular 
state to tackle diversity and pluralism. To solve this problem, Zucca 
proposes a twofold strategy «[o]n the one hand, [the secular state] should 
promote, as far as possible, active communication and mutual 
understanding among all the groups of a society. On the other, it should 
accept that in some specific cases we face conflicts between religion and 
the secular state that cannot be solved by appeal to broader common 
principles. In these limited cases, we have to agree to disagree, and the 
default position, therefore, will have to promote a thinner notion of 
coexistence among different groups and individuals on the basis of clear 




Both the analysis of problems and of the options to solve the challenges of 
the secular state are opened questions. Probably our discussions these days 
may offer fresh arguments and tools in order to adequately address these 
important challenges. 
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